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NO. 9 FEBRUARY 2019 Introduction 
After the Katowice Climate Summit 
Building Blocks for the EU Climate Agenda 
Susanne Dröge and Vijeta Rattani 
In Katowice, Poland, the 24th meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP24) under 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) took place 
in December 2018. The parties adopted a rulebook for the implementation of the Paris 
Agreement, which was an urgent and necessary step to operationalise the climate 
regime that is taking effect from 2020 onwards. The COP also addressed short-term 
climate ambitions by finishing the Talanoa Dialogue, a platform dialogue including 
stakeholders from civil society for sounding out mitigation potential before 2020. The 
European Union (EU) and its member states are among the few global actors remain-
ing with the means and determination to follow up on supporting the international 
climate agenda. Thus, in preparation of the 2019 September climate summit convened 
by the UN Secretary-General (UNSG), António Guterres, the EU will have to demon-
strate its willingness to reduce emissions by upgrading short- and long-term targets 
and to support poor countries, politically and financially. The vulnerable developing 
countries rely on the EU and its member states as leaders and partners for the national 
implementation of the rulebook’s technicalities. Not least, the EU has to focus on 
deepening cooperation with emerging countries and on raising awareness for climate 
change across policy fields. 
 
The Katowice Rulebook spells out rules and 
procedures for nearly all provisions of the 
Paris Agreement (2015), such as mitigation, 
adaptation, finance, transparency, and 
periodic stocktakes of global and national 
activities. Taking final decisions on how the 
Paris Agreement can be operationalised was 
the primary mandate for COP24 in Poland. 
At the outset of the conference – even 
though parties stressed the need for a com-
plete and balanced rulebook – there was 
still scepticism regarding delivery, consider-
ing that a wide array of issues were to be 
deliberated and agreed upon in a short span 
of the conference. As the Polish COP presi-
dency came in late to pull the strings – 
and seemingly was occupied pushing for 
domestic priorities such as E-mobility, a just 
transition in the energy sector, as well as 
the role of forests as carbon sinks – a com-
pletion of the rulebook was not a safe bet. 
Two issues on which parties could not 
fully agree during COP24 were postponed, 
as were a number of details. Final details on 
rules for market instruments such as emis-
sions trading and the Clean Development 
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Mechanism, which are integrated with new 
instruments as “cooperative approaches” 
under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, are 
due to be agreed upon in 2019. A process 
for defining the annual financial resources 
that will be provided to developing coun-
tries will start in November 2020. 
Rules on Information and 
Transparency 
Differentiation – a Never-ending 
Story 
A crucial step in the rulebook negotiations 
was to overcome calls for differentiation. 
Basically, this call goes back to a division 
of parties: those with a larger responsibility 
for climate change – the developed coun-
tries – and those that are mostly affected 
by the impacts. A division between devel-
oped and developing countries was estab-
lished under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto 
Protocol to substantiate the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibil-
itiesand respective capabilities (CBDR&RC; 
UNFCCC Article 3). The bifurcation of the 
parties was surmounted by using language 
in the Paris Agreement that includes emerg-
ing economies such as China, Brazil, and 
India on a voluntary basis in all climate 
policy dimensions. 
The demands for equity in the rulebook 
negotiations refer to the differentiation of 
obligations along the CBDR&RC principle – 
including losses and damages caused by 
climate change. The differentiation issue 
returned because the installation of rules 
on emissions accounting and reporting 
require considerable technical and bureau-
cratic capacities. As the idea of uniform 
reporting gained traction during the talks 
in 2018, the need for “selective flexibility” 
emerged. As a result, the “enhanced trans-
parency framework” of the Rulebook offers 
some flexibility for those countries that 
do not have the capacity to immediately 
deliver all information and reporting, for 
example the Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs). 
The Rulebook introduces an obligation 
that parties – on the backdrop of their 
nationally determined contributions 
(NDCs) – provide a national inventory 
report and the necessary information to 
track what actually is being achieved at 
the national level. Two more reviews are 
introduced that draw on experts in order 
to judge on actual national achievements: 
one as a technical review, the other as a 
peer review. Parties need to submit a first 
report by 2024. Only the LDCs and small 
island states are provided flexibility in terms 
of scope, frequency, and details of reporting. 
Similarly, also for the global overview 
of the national climate policy activities, 
Figure 1 
UN climate agenda – timeline and deliverables 
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the Global Stocktake (GST, see below), dif-
ferentiation concerns were raised. The Paris 
Agreement requires equity as a guiding 
principle for the stocktake. The Rulebook, 
however, does not address how equity 
should be incorporated when conducting 
the stocktaking or how to include it in the 
content and overall outcome. 
Last, but not least, the developing coun-
tries demanded differentiation – meaning 
stricter rules – for communication on 
financial commitments and more ambi-
tious NDCs for the developed countries. 
This way, assessing their willingness to take 
over responsibility and financial burdens 
would become more transparent. 
Information about Emission 
Reductions 
Regarding the mitigation of emissions, par-
ties agreed how “information necessary for 
clarity, transparency, and understanding” 
should be provided. Countries can deter-
mine for themselves which information is 
applicable to their NDCs. The actual tech-
nical accounting guidelines for NDCs were 
established. This step was necessary because, 
as with the Paris Agreement, more coun-
tries have pledged to reduce emissions than 
were previously bound to do so under the 
Kyoto Protocol. The accounting guidelines 
are set out by the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC). 
Again, the differentiation theme was 
raised because common metrics were a 
matter of dispute that needed to be resolved 
(“a ton is a ton”), as were the methodologi-
cal approaches to reporting. Both are cru-
cial for consistency in the national reports 
and the global stocktake of climate action. 
The existing NDCs include a wide range 
of timelines, for example the EU submitted 
a target for 2030, Australia has chosen 
2025, and moreover, countries have chosen 
different base years. A decision on a com-
mon timeframe for reporting was post-
poned until 2031, which means that, in the 
meantime, countries can create NDCs for 
any time period they prefer. 
Adaptation, Finance, and 
Stocktaking 
Moreover, the Rulebook lays out communi-
cations about adaptation to climate change 
more precisely. Countries can choose to 
communicate their priorities, plans, actions, 
and support needs either in their NCDs, 
national communications, or using national 
adaptation plans. The topic of climate-
induced losses and damages – introduced 
by small island states and covered by the 
Warsaw International Mechanism since 
2013 – is not mentioned in any section 
of the Rulebook. Instead, countries are 
instructed to report on loss and damage in 
the sections on adaptation, transparency, 
and the global stocktake. This represents 
a step backwards for developing countries. 
Developed countries are obliged to report 
their financial support for developing coun-
tries on a biennial basis. The obligation 
includes information on the climate-speci-
ficity of the finance provided, which will 
prevent “green-washing” of pre-existing 
development finance, and on any further 
efforts that could bring about more funds, 
especially from public sources. Starting in 
2021, the UNFCCC secretariat will collect 
the relevant information and set up related 
workshops. A ministerial dialogue on cli-
mate finance should also convene biennially 
to draw on the reports. However, a new 
long-term financial goal was not agreed. 
Instead, deliberations on a new financial 
goal that goes beyond US$100 billion per 
year will start in November 2020. 
The “Global Stocktake” (GST, Article 14 
PA) is the primary top-down component of 
the otherwise decentralised architecture of 
the Paris Agreement. The idea behind it is 
to have a global review of announced cli-
mate policy pledges made by the parties 
(NDCs) every five years (see Figure 1, p. 2), 
including mitigation achievements, finan-
cial commitments, and other support meas-
ures such as technology-transfer and 
capacity-building. The GST will be a key 
tool for informing parties on the collective 
progress regarding the Paris Agreement as a 
whole, namely on its purpose to limit the 
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rise of the global mean temperature to well 
below 2°C and to strive for 1.5°C, climate 
resilience and low-carbon development. 
The parties agreed in Katowice on “sources 
of input” for the GST beyond the already 
existing ones, such as the IPCC Sixth Assess-
ment Report. Additional sources include 
non-party stakeholders’ submissions to the 
GST. Also agreed was the actual conduct of 
the GST under the UNFCCC and the respon-
sibilities for preparing it. 
Perceptions of the Outcomes 
Although most developed countries view 
the Rulebook package as being balanced 
and hail the fact that it could be agreed, 
the developing countries – including least-
developed countries and small island states 
– think that developed countries were suc-
cessfully able to pressure them into giving 
in to their demands. They see the overall 
outcome as “mitigation-centric” – meaning 
that aspects crucial to them were watered 
down, including predictable financial sup-
port and equity. 
The equity issue is exemplified by the 
risks from loss and damage: Developing 
countries believe that they are mostly left 
on their own to counter climate risks and 
impacts, with no funds in sight. This per-
ception is reinforced by the lack of immedi-
ate climate action being taken by developed 
countries in the short run. Small island 
developing states, the African group, civil 
society, and youth groups were dissatisfied 
that the Rulebook does not prescribe an 
action plan to immediately raise climate 
ambitions, especially in light of the IPCC 
1.5°C global warming report, which shows 
that pathways which do not overshoot tem-
perature limits can only be achieved if deci-
sive action is taken in the next 12 years. 
Another UNEP Emission Gap Report released 
ahead of the COP substantiates that current 
global efforts would need to be increased by 
five times in order to stay within the 1.5°C 
limit. A discussion held on the IPCC report 
magnified the division between countries 
with ambitions and those that wish to block; 
Kuwait, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the United 
States rejected “welcoming” the report. 
The different judgements on the Rule-
book, however, refer to different expecta-
tions about the Rulebook. It is the backbone 
of the Paris Agreement, as it spells out de-
tails of its application. Thus, by itself, the 
Rulebook is a significant step for the climate 
regime. Yet, it cannot provide sufficient am-
bition for lowering emissions more quickly, 
as the regime is not providing binding miti-
gation mechanisms or sanctions to enforce 
compliance. Climate action is left to the 
political processes, nationally and inter-
nationally, as well as to non-state actors. 
Enforcement is left to the diplomatic skills 
of proactive countries. 
The EU at COP24 
The EU was crucial in driving the negotia-
tions forward and supporting the Polish 
presidency in the formation of the Rule-
book. Its most notable success was teaming 
up with developed countries and partnering 
with China to push for stringent, uniform 
reporting rules. It also gave in to developing 
countries’ calls to discuss modalities for 
indicative finance provisions and agreed to 
a clear process for assessing and reviewing 
the financial provisions. 
The EU could not deliver much in detail-
ing equity and its implementation in the 
GST though. It is now left to the final nego-
tiations on the GST as to how equity could 
be reflected and operationalised. 
Developing countries and civil society 
were dissatisfied with the EU’s noncommit-
tal approach to matters of adaptation 
finance and loss and damage. In particular, 
they expressed further disappointment that 
the EU was not able to increase its short-
term climate ambitions. Still, the EU pushed 
for stronger language on the 1.5°C tempera-
ture target in the Talanoa Dialogue (a forum 
introduced under the Fiji COP presidency 
in 2017, which included civil society mem-
bers). This dialogue was ended in Katowice 
with a “Talanoa Call for Action” and pro-
duced a High Ambition Coalition – a 
revival of the 2015 coalition in Paris. In this 
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context, the EU declared it would look into 
options for more climate protection meas-
ures by 2020. Yet, it is unlikely that this 
announcement can bring about an actual 
reduction in EU emissions during the 
course of 2019. 
The EU Still ahead of the Curve? 
Shortly before the summit in Katowice, the 
EU highlighted in a Council decision in No-
vember 2018 the need for an ambitious and 
robust rulebook and for stepping up climate 
protection measures. The European Com-
mission drafted a vision for a climate-neutral 
Europe by 2050 (“A Clean Planet for all”). 
This vision will be subject to further 
debates and elaborations in 2019 and will 
develop into the EU’s submission to the 
UNFCCC for a long-term climate strategy 
next year. With this vision, the EU is fol-
lowing up on the Paris Agreement concept 
of climate neutrality as a target for the 
second half of this century. The scenarios 
applied include a wide range of EU policy 
areas and options to tackle greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions. With the publication, the 
EU once more sets the tone and serves as an 
example for other countries – even though 
it is not clear whether the 2019 EU spring 
Council will endorse the vision already this 
year. 
A more critical issue is the EU’s short- 
to mid-term engagement through the next 
round of NDCs, due in 2020 for COP26. A 
first attempt by the Commission to suggest 
an increase in the 40 per cent emissions 
reduction target for 2030 to 45 per cent 
failed with member states in summer 2018. 
In February 2019, the European Parlia-
ment’s Environment Committee suggested 
an increase to 55 percent emission cuts 
compared to 1990 levels. By increasing the 
target for 2030 and submitting a higher 
pledge, the EU could increase its credibility 
and thereby also mask the inaction regard-
ing its ambitions prior to 2020 under the 
Talanoa Dialogue. 
EU Partnerships – Strengthening 
of Ties Needed 
With the Katowice Rulebook, the gap has 
widened between the clarity of how global 
climate policy should be conducted and 
the actual climate measures being taken 
on the ground. Meanwhile, GHG emissions 
are surging – having reached an all-time 
high in 2018 – and are further accumulat-
ing in the atmosphere, thereby impeding 
the chances for a near-term trend reversal. 
In order to follow the concept of the 
Paris Agreement – a progressive pledge 
and review process based on national 
actions – the EU has been attempting to 
find and strengthen allies. In particular, 
since the United States dropped out in 
2017, this has become one of the major 
climate diplomacy challenges. The attempts 
at closing ranks with China, Canada, and 
Mexico have been overshadowed by con-
flicts in trade relations with the United 
States and China as well as the EU’s inter-
nal preoccupations during the last two 
years with a pending Brexit. In May, before 
the European elections this spring, EU 
leaders will decide in Sibiu, Romania, how 
to approach their key challenges. Addition-
ally, the EU and its member states have to 
take up loose ends and feed strategies into 
a new Commission, which will take office 
at the end of 2019. EU coalition formation 
has become even more challenging as 
Brazil, which was a key supporter of the 
Paris Agreement, is no longer engaging in 
collective actions for climate protection. 
In fact, after the election of Jair Bolsonaro, 
Brazil joined the group of naysayers and is 
leaving it to other Latin American countries 
to support the Paris Agreement. Brazil 
will no longer act as host to the next COP; 
instead Chile and Costa Rica will host the 
COP25 and the pre-COP meeting respectively. 
This will bring more attention to the 
Latin American countries’ interests and to 
their potential role in climate diplomacy. 
For instance, the EU can engage with the 
proactive AILAC countries (Independent 
Association of Latin America and the Carib-
bean) – a group of eight countries, includ-
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ing Chile, Peru, and Colombia – on finish-
ing the rules for market mechanisms in the 
Rulebook and delivering on the agreed next 
steps. 
With both India and China, a crucial 
area of cooperation with the EU is clear and 
transparent reporting that is in compliance 
with the Rulebook. With respect to India, 
this has gained urgency considering that 
the UN recently questioned India’s forest-
cover data submitted for potential funds 
due to lack of transparency. Both Asian 
giants have showcased their domestic cli-
mate achievements related to renewables, 
energy efficiency, sustainable cities, and 
green growth, but they have nevertheless 
shown reluctance to pledge greater ambi-
tions internationally. 
India, in particular, has claimed to be a 
climate champion in the area of installed 
renewables capacity and has looked to-
wards the EU for cooperation in related 
technologies. Access to affordable, climate-
friendly, sustainable technologies should 
continue to be a basis for regular coopera-
tion between the EU and its Asian partners. 
The EU declared in Katowice its interest in 
technological cooperation in bioenergy 
storage and capture as well as the circular 
economy. This could also provide an area 
for future cooperation to promote invest-
ment opportunities. 
The most vulnerable countries to climate 
change, including the small island states, 
rely on the EU both with regard to greater 
ambitions towards mitigation as well as 
more support in the financial and political 
dimensions. 
The EU and its member states will have 
to assist them with the next round of NDCs 
and the related conceptual and procedural 
challenges, as well as with the implementa-
tion of the new accounting and reporting 
rules. Since much of the climate action 
in developing countries hinges primarily 
on predictable and sustainable financial 
sources, this remains a sensitive topic. In 
2020 a process will begin to increase the 
floor of US$100 billion per year from 2025 
onwards. While this will entail both miti-
gation and adaptation finance, a sustained 
commitment to the Adaptation Fund – 
which is currently replenished on an ad hoc 
basis – and progress on the operationalisa-
tion of financial means for losses and dam-
ages from climate impacts are equally im-
portant. 
September Climate Summit 
in New York 
With current and projected climate impacts 
becoming more severe, the climate summit 
on 23rd September – convened by UNSG 
Guterres under the heading “A Race We Can 
Win. A Race We Must Win” – is a venue 
where not only the EU, but also India and 
China could show political will in prepa-
ration of an ambitious national strategy 
and action plan to counter climate change. 
Thus, a competition among the great play-
ers regarding the revision of their NDCs 
would be a positive signal in preparation 
of this UNSG event. The UNSG wants to link 
the UNFCCC process more strongly with dif-
ferent levels of governance (regions, cities), 
private business, and citizens across several 
key areas of climate policy. In this regard, 
engagement with sub-national actors and 
civil society in the United States needs to 
be maintained to safeguard the role of the 
United States in the climate regime – even 
though this is only in anticipation of an-
other U-turn in the US approach to climate 
cooperation. 
Given the list of deliverables of the Rule-
book, EU external activities that strengthen 
ties and deepen collaboration are needed 
this year. This should not be limited to 
COP25 and the New York summit. Political 
support should include raising awareness 
across other policy fields and institutions. 
The loss and damage issue is one example, 
because it has been subject to debates 
in the UN Security Council several times 
already under the header of climate risks, 
peace and security. The latest debate was 
hosted by the Dominican Republic on 25st 
January 2019. Following up with five EU 
members (Belgium, France, Germany, 
United Kingdom, Poland) being members 
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of the UN Security Council in 2019, the EU 
can walk the talk together with small island 
states by keeping attention focussed on cli-
mate risks. 
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